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Highlights 
• We experimentally investigate spillover effects of gender quotas on unethical 
behavior. 
• We find that gender quotas do not affect subsequent unethical behavior of 
women and men.  
• More competitive, high performing females are more dishonest than their male 
counterparts. 
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1. Introduction 
A growing literature highlights the effectiveness of affirmative actions in closing the 
gender gap in competitive environments. While previous studies provide evidence that 
quotas positively affect women`s participation without hurting efficiency (Balafoutas 
and Sutter, 2012; Villeval, 2012; Niederle et al., 2013), little is known about the effects 
of introducing a quota on subsequent behavior of both men and women.  
Sutter and Balafoutas (2012) find that introducing quotas and other affirmative actions 
do not entail efficiency losses in a following coordination task. Similarly, no harmful 
spillover effects of quotas are found on later performance within teams (Kölle, 2016). 
In an artefactual field experiment in the context of castes, Banerjee et al. (2016) 
conclude that being exposed to an affirmative action policy has no impact on 
subsequent unethical behavior and spite against subjects from the benefited group. 
In the presence of quotas, the decision to hire or promote individuals is based on 
observable characteristics (i.e. gender), different than merit. Working in such an 
environment may be perceived as unfair (Harrison et al. 2006) and lead to a higher 
moral flexibility, inducing individuals to engage in self-serving dishonesty (Houser et 
al. 2012). For men, the introduction of a quota may justify dishonest behavior as a 
corrective mechanism against reverse discrimination. Women may be more likely to 
cheat in the absence of quotas, possibly because feeling disadvantaged with respect 
to men. 
We investigate the possible spillover effects of gender quotas on subsequent, 
unrelated, unethical behavior.  
 
2. The experiment 
Our experiment has two parts; subjects were informed about Part 2 only after the 
completion of Part 1.  
Part 1 is divided in 5 stages. Subjects were randomly assigned into groups composed 
by six men and six women. The experimental task in each stage was to add as many 
sets of three three-digit numbers and two decimal numbers as possible within 4 
minutes (similar to Niederle and Vesterlund, 2013). 
In stage 1 (piece rate), subjects receive €0.50 for each correct calculation. In stage 2 
(compulsory tournament), group members compete against each other. The four 
members who solve the most calculations are paid €1.50 per correct answer. The other 
eight group members receive nothing. In stage 3 (choice1) subjects choose whether 
they want to be paid under a piece rate or a tournament scheme (receiving a payoff of 
€1.50 when being among the four winners, nothing otherwise). In stage 4 (choice2), 
only those subjects who did choose the competition in choice1, can decide whether 
they want to be paid under a piece rate or a tournament scheme (receiving a payoff of 
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€3 per calculation when being among the two winners, nothing otherwise).‡ In both 
stages 3 and 4, if the tournament is chosen, the subject’s performance in the task is 
compared to the other group members’ performance in stage 2. Stages 3 and 4 
replicate a career ladder: when choosing the tournament in stage 4, this payment 
scheme is applied conditionally on being among the winners of stage 3 competition.  
To examine the effects of quotas, we vary the competition rules across two treatments. 
In the NoQuota Treatment (NQT), the winners in stage 3 and stage 4 are, respectively, 
the four and two group members with the largest numbers of correct calculations, 
regardless of gender.   
In the Quota Treatment (QT) we introduce a quota both in stage 3 and stage 4. In stage 
3 at least two women have to be among the four winners of the tournament, 
irrespective of the ordinal ranking of group members’ performances. Therefore, the two 
best-performing women are always winners in stage 3. Similarly, in stage 4 the best 
best-performing woman is always a winner. After the decision in stage 4 we elicit 
participants’ beliefs about relative ranking in stage 2. 
In stage 5 we elicit risk preferences as in Crosetto and Filippin, (2013). In each stage 
no information about previous payoffs was given to subjects until the end of part 2.  
In Part 2 we measure the possible spillovers of gender quotas on subsequent 
dishonest behavior using a variation of the die under-the-cup task (Shalvi et al., 2011). 
In our experiment, reporting an odd number results in getting €4 while reporting an 
even number results in getting €1.  
The experiment was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007), subjects were 
recruited using HROOT (Bock et al. 2014). From September to December 2016, 192 
subjects participated, divided in four sessions of 24 subjects per treatment. Subjects 
received a show-up fee of €5 plus their earnings from one randomly selected stage 
between 1 and 4, their earnings from stage 5 and from the die under-the-cup task. 
 
3. Results 
Figure 1 displays the proportion of men and women reporting an odd number in the 
die-under-the-cup task under the NoQuota and Quota treatment. Overall, both men 
and women reported a significantly higher number of odd numbers than 50% (p=0.00). 
Women are slightly more likely to report an odd number than men, but differences 
between genders are not significant both within treatment (𝜒2(1)=1.64, p=0.20) and 
across treatments (NQT: 𝜒2(1)=0.00, p=1.00; QT:  𝜒2(1)=0.06, p=0.81). This evidence 
suggests that introducing quotas has no systematic effect on subsequent cheating 
behavior on both genders. 
                                                          
‡ We use the strategy method for the decision to compete in stage 4. See the Experimental Instructions in the 
Supplementary Material. 
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Figure 1: Proportion of men and women reporting an odd number in the die 
under-the-cup task, by treatment. Red line indicates 50%.  
 
We further investigate if performance affects the individual`s decision to report an odd 
number. Participants with high performance might be less reluctant to lie to maximize 
their payoffs by doing so, because of a feeling of entitlement (Schurr and Ritov, 2016). 
Participants with low performance might be willing to lie to recover for their losses.  
We identify as high performers those participants ranked in the top 4 positions in the 
compulsory tournament (stage 2). We do not find significant difference on the reporting 
decision of high performers compared to other (lower ranked) subjects within 
treatments (NQT: 𝜒2(1)=0.95, p=0.33; QT:  𝜒2(1)=0.22, p=0.64).  Similarly, we observe 
no treatment effect in high (𝜒2(1)=0.13, p=0.72) or lower ranked individuals 
(𝜒2(1)=0.01, p=0.90). However, when considering both treatments together, high 
performers females were significantly more likely to report an odd number than their 
male counterparts (𝜒2(1)=3.40, p=0.07, N=79). Gender differences are not significant 
for the lower ranked performers (𝜒2(1)=0.21, p=0.64, N=113). 
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Figure 2: Proportion of men and women reporting an odd number in the die 
under-the-cup task depending on their stage 2 performance and on their 
competitive choice in stage 3 and 4. Error bars indicate 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
Next, we investigate the effect of the individual`s willingness to compete on unethical 
behavior. While previous experiments focused on the effect of tournaments on honesty 
when compensation is tied to relative performance, differently than us, they cannot 
disentangle among the effect of competition per se and the effect of strategic choice 
of competition on dishonest behavior (Conrads et al., 2014; Dato and Nieken, 2015; 
Schurr and Ritov, 2016). Figure 2 displays the proportion of men and women reporting 
an odd number in the die under-the-cup task depending on whether they chose 
competition in stage 3 (panel a, N=152) and in stage 4 (panel b, N=107). Gender 
differences remain significant for high performers: females who chose competition are 
more likely to report an odd number than their males’ counterpart (Fisher`s exact tests, 
stage 3: p=0.02, N=72; stage 4: p=0.06, N=50). Gender differences are not significant 
for the other participants (stage 3: 𝜒2: p=0.82; stage 4, Fisher`s exact test: p=1.00). 
The interaction between female and performance in stage 2 is positive and marginally 
significant (see models (4)- (5), Table 1, showing the extent to which the difference in 
the probability to report an odd number between males and females changes with 
respect to performance.§ 
These results suggest that high performing women, when experiencing and choosing 
a competitive environment, are more prone than men to lie to increase their payoff, 
independently on the presence of gender quotas.  
 
                                                          
§ If we include beliefs about own ranking in stage 2 in model 5, its coefficient is not significant and other 
results are unchanged. The same is observed when including the field of study. 
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Table 1. Determinants of unethical behavior. 
Dependent Variable 1 if an odd number is reported, 0 otherwise 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Quota 0.010 0.011 -0.079 -0.068 -0.073 
1 if Quota, 0 otherwise (0.057) (0.057) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
      
Female 0.094 0.089 0.135** -0.176 -0.146 
1 if Woman, 0 otherwise (0.056) (0.057) (0.064) (0.185) (0.180) 
      
Performance in stage 2 
(compulsory tournament) 
 
-0.009 
(0.016) 
-0.008 
(0.019) 
-0.032 
(0.024) 
-0.030 
(0.022) 
      
Competition in stages 3 and 4 
1 if competition is chosen both in 
stage 3 and 4, 0 if competition is 
chosen only at stage 3 
 
 
0.162** 
(0.083) 
0.174** 
(0.084) 
0.152** 
(0.082) 
      
Performance in compulsory 
tournament x Female 
  
 
0.076* 
(0.041) 
0.072* 
(0.040) 
      
Risk aversion 
Continuous variable between 1 
(risk averse) and 100 (risk lover) 
   
 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
      
Observations 192 192 152 152 152 
Pseudo R2 0.0147 0.0166 0.0517 0.0735 0.1082 
LR chi2 2.77 3.13 7.95 11.30 16.63 
Prob > chi2 0.2508 0.3724 0.0933 0.0458 0.0107 
Notes: The table reports marginal effects of the respective independent variables on the 
probability of reporting an odd number. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *: p 
< 0.10; **: p < 0.05; ***: p < 0.01.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
We examine the spillover effects of gender quotas on unethical behavior: quotas have 
no effect on men and women’s reporting behavior. However, we find that high 
performing competitive females are more likely to engage in dishonest reporting in a 
die-under-cup task with respect to their male counterparts. The mechanism explaining 
this evidence might be a feeling of redemption associated with being a high performing 
woman in a male-stereotyped environment. Further research is needed to test the link 
between tournament-like incentives, the task used, and subsequent unethical 
behavior.  
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